Moral basis and effectiveness of rights: poverty as a demand for justice

Abstract

The effectiveness of rights does not depend only on norms, nor does it only involve the action of governments: there is a set of ethical and moral practices, together with the lack of social empathy, which prevent us from seeing the problem of the effective protection of the rights of those who are in contexts of vulnerability. This is a cornerstone in the construction of ethical responsibilities in the face of the problem. Henry Shue has provided some arguments on the rational moral relevance that supports the obligation institutionalized through Law to combat this type of problem in today’s societies; in particular, he applies the notions of moral right and basic right, and their positive and negative demands, in relation to the problem of poverty. In the first part of this article, the conceptual importance of this construction is highlighted, in order to then link this conceptual structure with the pluralist vision of priority fundamental rights in contexts of vulnerability. In the second part, the special case of the protection of the poorest is analyzed, investigating the types of obligations imposed by poverty and the protection of basic rights such as the right to subsistence in conditions of dignity.