Reinforced majorities and the formation of constitutional bodies

comments on current events

Abstract

In the appointment of members to constitutional bodies entrusted to legislative assemblies through qualified majorities, dysfunctions commonly arise. The most frequent issues are, first, the allocation of quotas among the main parliamentary groups, where each group selects its candidates, and the other accepts them in exchange for having their own candidates approved. Second, the failure to comply with deadlines for replacing members of these bodies whose terms have expired. The combination of these practices leads to institutional deterioration. However, despite being a widespread issue in contemporary constitutional systems, no effective remedies have been found to overcome it. One proposed solution is the elimination of the prorrogatio provision legislatively established, though it is uncertain whether this would be effective. Another option could involve creating an alternative, objective system for appointments if the established timeframe elapses without action, although such a proposal is unlikely to gain traction. In any case, the debate on this issue could help foster a climate that persuades political groups of the benefits of respecting constitutional provisions regarding the timing of appointments and the qualifications of appointees.