Fundamental social rights between the reservation of the possible and the existential minimum

Abstract

This study aims to analyze the theoretical positions of the "reservation of the possible" and the "existential minimum," especially concerning the fulfillment of fundamental social rights, which primarily aim to materialize the principle of human dignity. It is observed that fundamental social rights face challenges in becoming concrete, particularly in response to the State's claim of scarce financial resources. On the other hand, the efforts of philosophers and legal theorists to establish parameters for promoting a dignified life are evident. Among these parameters, the existential minimum stands out, which should be treated as a foundational rule and a standard of acceptability, encompassing the minimum content of fundamental rights in situations of resource scarcity, as is often the case.

Conversely, in countries with strong economic and financial performance, the invocation of the existential minimum is somewhat tempered—either to adjust it to a higher level than the minimum seen in countries facing administrative penury or to filter among claimants of benefits those who are genuinely in need, thereby also improving public affairs management. In summary, the understanding of the existential minimum serves as a referential standard, not a one-size-fits-all model, but rather as a baseline for meeting the most basic needs of human dignity. It represents a "minimum minimorum" threshold—below which no society should fall—while allowing for adjustments toward a higher standard in accordance with the broader capabilities of certain societies.